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PREFACE 
As pressure for the use of our public lands increase, 
the idea of what I will call particularized and situational 
management of our public lands needs to be dealt with. It 
is my - contention that decision-making in our public resource 
agencies at the on-the-ground managerial level is at best 
faulty, and, in fact, is not decision-making at all. Perhaps 
before I go on, a definition is in order. Each and every 
resource decision that a manager faces confronts him with 
unique problems economically, ecologically and politically. 
These decisions, therefore, are unsolvable by books or manuals 
which seem to be the mainstay of federal resource decision­
making, and must be decided individually, particularly and 
situationally. Thus, the term particularized and situational 
management.* 
It is the now stated purpose of this paper to determine, 
hopefully conclusively, whether or not more real decision­
making powers are warranted for the on-the-ground manager in 
our federal resource agencies. In the light of what seems 
to me the undisputable statement that resource managers face 
*The term is not my own. The credit is due Prof. R.W. Behan 
for his lectures which prompted this paper. 
iv 
iinique problems economically, ecologically and politically 
with each decision that they attempt to make, I am perhaps 
biased from the outset that particularized and situational 
management is the answer to resource decision-making. I am 
not biased, however, in seeking here to prove or disprove 
this assertion. 
The National Park Service, in February, 1968, apparently 
concerned with precisely the same problem with which I will 
attempt to deal in this paper^ discontinued the use of its 
manuals, guidelines, handbooks, etc., which until that time had 
been the decision-maker's decision-maker. They subsequently 
replaced the manuals with three booklets.measuring in thick­
ness and in total approximately one inch. These booklets 
described Park Service administrative policies, and left to 
the manager the powers of decision-making within the realm 
of these policies. Gone were the times when a park ranger 
faced with a problem could merely look in the manual for a 
precise and unqualified answer. He was virtually on his own 
within the limitations of Park Service policies to deal with 
the economical, ecological and political aspects of the 
problem in a way which he calculated would best satisfy that 
problem. 
V 
In the first two chapters, "The Park Service Experiment" 
and the administrative policies which the Park Service pur­
sued in order to give the on-the-ground decision-maker more 
authority will be presented. Hopefully, these will set the 
stage for the ensuing chapters - discussions evolving around 
topics which every public resource decision-maker must take 
into account. These facets of decision-making are: preformed 
decisions, the public interest, and rules, regulations, and 
manuals. 
Realizing that there are other inputs which must nec­
essarily precede many decisions, not the least of which is 
consideration of the resource itself, I have been selective 
and have singled out the above mentioned three. This was 
done not to detract from the importance of other consider­
ations in decision-making, but because I feel these are points, 
the resolution of which separates a resource technician from 
a resource decision-maker. Granted, a resource decision­
maker must have a thorough knowledge of the resource(s) with 
which he is dealing, this is taken as a given premise in 
this paper. 
This paper was originally intended for and about federal 
resource agencies, but has application for all formal organizations 
vi 
Chapter 1 
THE PARK SERVICE EXPERIMENT* 
In February of 1968, a decision was made by the then 
Director of the National Park Service, to eliminate that 
13 
agency's manuals. The director stated that this drastic 
action was needed because the "manuals were becoming a sub­
stitute for the park superintendents - the regional directors, 
2 6 
to exercise judgment." Further, that there was too much 
dependence on the manuals, and that decision-makers were 
"hiding behind" the manuals to protect their positions. In 
place of the discarded manuals, the director substituted 
three small and vaguely worded administrative policy book­
lets which will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
These administrative policy booklets provided little 
guidance to a decision-maker in terms of specific duties, 
and, therefore, the quick break from the manuals, which were 
quite specific, was a complete and abrupt change. Along with 
the manual elimination, the agencies' authority delegation, 
work standards, and goals and objectives of the Service itself 
*I am indebted to Mr. Thurman Trosper for much of what appears 
in this chapter. Mr. Trosper was employed in the Washington 
office of the National Park Service while these procedures 
were taking place. 
1 
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were eliminated. Somewhat of a "reign of terror" presided 
in the Service, as the professional managers and decision­
makers, not knowing what their authority to make decisions 
was, simply did not make any decisions, and passed responsi­
bility ultimately to the director. A fear of retaliation 
settled over the Service, that when you made a mistake, you 
were out. This situation became almost intolerable for honest, 
committed professionals, for they never knew when they might 
be reorganized out of a career for making some "wrong" 
decision. 
These actions by the director resulted in his running a 
"one-man band" so to speak. In all likelihood this was an 
objective of the director to begin with. Professional 
managers were forced to mirror the director's wishes, and if 
they made a "wrong" decision in his estimation, he had a 
2 6 
technique, this was to reorganize. These continual 
"reorganizations every three to six months", plus the other 
previously described actions put the Service into a constant 
state of confusion and chaos. Nobody knew what they were to 
do or what anyone else was doing. Wanting to protect their 
careers, the decision-makers in the Service bucked decisions 
up the line, ultimately to the director. This whole campaign 
turned into a management technique on the part of the director. 
3 
He, and only he, decided on matters of any significance. 
His weapon in this climb to autocracy was reorganization. 
If managers and decision-makers made "wrong" decisions, or 
if the director's wishes were not included in the decision 
process, they were "reorganized out" of positions of responsi­
bility. It all turned into quite a complicated contradiction. 
First, the manuals, rules and regulations were eliminated, 
ostensibly to give managers a freer hand in decision-making. 
This done, the director saw to it that any decisions of sig­
nificance were either made by him or had his approval. It 
was a subtle form of coercion. Thus, through these actions, 
the on-the-ground decision-maker in actuality was exercising 
less judgment now than he did before the manuals were eliminated. 
This was, in my opinion, not a direct result of the elimination 
of the manuals, but of the director's management technique. 
He was "not an administrator - he could not delegate," and, 
26 therefore, the "experiment" was doomed from the outset. 
For, whether by accident or design, the director took on the 
job of decision-making for the entire Service. The task was 
enormous, involving 284 different areas, nearly 30,000,000 
acres and an annual budget of $300 million. (Approximate 
13 
1972 figures) Due to the constant reorganizations and 
the elimination of the manuals, without replacing them with 
4 
any standards, goals and objectives, or delegations of auth­
ority, the director had destroyed open coiranunications and 
moved everyone to protecting their own interests. Even to­
day, as far as administration is concerned, the Park Service 
2 6 
is a "place of chaos". 
To have made the "experiment" work, standards, goals, 
and delegations of authority would had to have been set 
up. To some extent work standards were outlined in the 
administrative policy booklets offering guidelines to the 
decision-maker, but goals and delegations of authority were 
noticeably lacking. Without goals, the managers, by defini­
tion, had nothing to aim for in their activities with the 
exception of preserving their careers. Along with this, is 
the fact that there was no delegation of authority. This 
is, I think, the key to decentralization of organizations -
to let the on-ground manager know where and how far in which 
he can operate, and let him go.^^ 
The director realized this too late. A crash project 
was implemented to determine the above, but the director was 
fired before they could be implemented, and the new director 
did not utilize the findings. What the decision-makers had 
to assist them in their duties is the subject of the next 
chapter. 
Chapter 2 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES 
The Administrative Policy booklets, of which I have 
previously written, are surely a study in governmental 
brevity. The booklets of which there are three, (one each 
for natural areas, historical areas, and recreational areas 
of the National Park System), measure a scant 5 11/16 inches 
by 9 2/16 inches, with an average thickness of approximately 
5/16 of an inch. Also, a major portion of the booklets are 
repetitious. I mention this not to detract from the book­
let's contents, but for a comparison to the manuals of most 
large government agencies consisting of ream upon ream of 
bureaucratic exactness, that if not specifically designed 
to strip a resource manager of his innovative and resourceful 
qualities, do so inadvertently. This is not so with the Park 
Service booklets. 
The Park Service booklets are at once all-encompassing, 
yet leave much to the discretion, innovation and resource­
fulness of the professional managers in the Service. As an 
example, the booklet for natural areas covers 116 topics 
from advertising through religious services, to wildlife 
population. To illustrate, two topics from the natural 
5 
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areas booklet are included in their entirety below. 
Wildlife Populations 
Wildlife populations will be controlled 
when necessary to maintain the health 
of the species, the native environment, 
and the scenic landscape, and to safe­
guard public health and safety. Ungu­
late populations will be maintained at 
the level that the range will carry in 
good health and without impairment to 
the soil, the vegetation, or to habitats 
of the several species in an area. 
Signs 
Roadside signing, whether regulatory, 
infoinmational, or interpretive is an 
integral part of the visitor experience, 
as well as road design. Care should 
be exercised to insure that the quality 
and design of all signing enhance the 
visitor experience.29 
The exactness is gone from these guidelines, and decision­
makers are left to determine what decision is best for the 
area ecologically, feasible economically, and desirable 
politically for the user public. The manager is virtually 
unrestrained in using his judgment and resourcefulness. And 
that is as it should be; for what else is a manager for? 
Surely no professional is needed to follow the strict and 
virtually unwaivering rules contained in, for example, the 
2 8 
Forest Service Manual. 
Manuals should be no more than guidelines for decision-
7 
makers. They cannot be a step by step progression of how to 
handle every conceivable situation if the organization is to 
improve and change in the face of changing values and knowledge. 
2 6 
For, "Manuals are only a repository of history," and we 
cannot look at history to solve all our problems or as a 
basis for all our decisions. If that were true, progress 
would never be made. Managers must be given a chance to use 
discretion in decisions affecting the vastly different 
ecologies, economies and publics encountered in our large 
resource agencies. 
These Administrative Policy booklets do just that. 
They are virtually all-encompassing, yet let individual 
managers decide what is best for his particular situation. 
Situational management can be a reality within the confines 
of these booklets and professional managers have the oppor­
tunity to utilize their skills in making decisions affecting 
their area of responsibility. These booklets could easily 
serve as a model for our resource agencies and other organ­
izations where common goals and objectives are present, but 
where restrictive manuals stifle the resourcefulness of 
professional managers and decision-makers. 
However, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the 
"Park Service experiment" did not work even though Park 
8 
Service personnel had these booklets at their disposal. 
Can this be called a failure for the concept of situational 
management? In view of the other things that took place 
during the period, I think not. For besides the complete 
elimination of the detailed manual system; delegation of 
authority, work standards, filing systems and even mail rout­
ing channels were destroyed. This drastic action destroyed 
all "habits", good and bad. Further, "one 'bad* decision" 
and managers were "in trouble" with the director. No goals 
were outlined, and the director, through his use of constant 
reorganizations, held Park Service personnel in fear of losing 
2 6 
their careers. In short. Park Service managers didn't man­
age or make decisions at all. "Nobody knew what they were to 
2 6 
do or what anyone else was doing." Park Service personnel 
were given the opportunity (through the Administrative Policy 
booklets) to exercise their judgment and discretion, but this 
then was neutralized by the extenuating circumstances described 
above. In view of this fact, no system of guidelines or 
manuals could conceivably have worked. Park Service managers 
one day enjoying the complete security of detailed and 
exacting manuals were without any security whatsoever the 
next. This though, instead of being the fault of the policy 
booklets, was the fault of the director's "management technique" 
and of his not having the foresight to realize that authority 
9 
delegation, goals, and the other points described above were 
essential for effectiveness in the Service. 
chapter 3 
PRE-FORMED DECISIONS 
Herbert Kaufman, in his book The Forest Ranger, has 
made popular a term that I find most fitting for my purpose 
here, this being "Pre-formed Decisions", which Kaufman defines 
thusly: 
...events and conditions in the field 
are anticipated as fully as possible, 
and courses of action to be taken for 
designated categories of such events 
and conditions are described. The 
field officers then need determine 
only into what category a particular 
circumstance falls; once this deter­
mination is made, he then simply follows 
the series of steps applicable to that 
category. Within each category, there­
fore, the decisions are "preformed."15 
The idea behind preformed decisions is not new; it has been 
employed since man discovered organization. More bluntly, 
preformed decisions are simply rules and regulations handed 
down from superiors to their subordinates in the decision­
making realm. The point of the matter though, is whether 
the man closest to the decision is really a decision-maker; 
whether or not he really makes a decision considering the 
economic, ecological and political circumstances of the par­
ticular situation which he faces. The manual is there and 
10 
11 
according to Kaufman, it is to the field officer's consider­
able advantage to categorize the problem in terms of the 
manual and to follow its dictates. Doing this by no means 
requires a decision-maker, for "Any warm, ambitious, and 
reasonably erect 'ticket puncher' can please his superiors 
by routinely and dogmatically applying the preformed decisions 
3 
contained in the Forest Servxce Manual..." 
I do not wish to single out the Forest Service here, 
for it is undoubtedly true that many organizations employ 
manuals and preformed decisions with as much or more vigor. 
However, I am more knowledgeable concerning Forest Service 
procedures; therefore, I have chosen this organization as a 
frame of reference in this regard. 
Perhaps at the crux of the matter are the concepts of 
centralization and decentralization. The Forest Service has 
maintained from its inception to the present that it is a 
highly decentralized organization leaving management de­
cisions to its field officers (district rangers). Indeed, 
"The Forest Service has made decentralization its cardinal 
principal of organization structure, the heart and core of 
its 'administrative philosophy'. The ideal (of decentral­
ization) has been affirmed and reaffirmed, over and over 
again, for every generation of foresters. It is now part 
12 
15 
of the dogma of the agency." But, is the Forest Service or 
for that matter, is any organization with the type of elaborate 
preformed decisions aptly described in The Forest Ranger 
really decentralized? That is, does the field officer 
really make decisions? For, "a result of governing by rules 
12 is centralization in decision-making." Kaufman suggests 
that tests whereby a group of rangers without all the usual 
preformed decisions encumbering them, be set up. Procedures 
such as l\imp-s\im allocations, abandonment of diaries and the 
manual, and less frequent inspections could be employed. 
Then, 
If experimentation discloses that 
field behavior can be controlled as 
effectively by inculcating the fact 
and value premises of central head­
quarters upon the minds of the field 
men without extensive use of close 
supervisory and enforcement procedures, 
as is possible with these devices, 
then an organization which gives 
every indication of decentralization 
by all the usual indicies (supervision, 
reference of matters to higher head­
quarters, the niamber and specificity 
of regulations under which field 
officers work, the provision of 
appeal from the decision of field 
agents, the decisions made by field 
men and the variety of duties performed) 
may in fact be as fully governed from 
the center as one without these visible 
paraphernalia of central direction. 
Such an experiment would undoubtedly prove very useful, but 
13 
since such an experiment is as yet forthcoming, a reliance 
on past and present investigators is mandatory. 
Concerning decentralization and decision-making, 
Bernard H. Ba\am, in his book Decentralization of Authority 
in a Bureaucracy, has written, "The substantive essence of 
the process of administrative decentralization is decision­
making."^ And it must be, for what else in an organization 
is there to decentralize? Surely, the prefoonned decisions 
described by Kaufman do not constitute decision-making 
authority, and, thus, do not constitute a decentralized 
organization. 
From free-use permits to huge sales 
of timber, from burning permits to 
fighting large fires, from requis­
itioning office supplies to maintaining 
discipline, classes of situations and 
patterns of response are detailed in 
the Manual. Every action is guided. 
This is not decentralization, but is a highly centralized 
organization, whereby line officers are virtually required 
to mirror the decisions already made for them. 
At the risk of deviating from my goal, I have presented 
the above discourse on decentralization to try to illustrate 
the complicity of the terms decentralization and decision­
making. For decision-making at the lower hierarchical 
14 
levels presupposes a decentralized organization - decen­
tralization, in fact, not only in word. Of course, it is 
true that different goals might be attached to different 
districts or units and these must be defined, but then, the 
on-the-ground decision-maker must be given the authority to 
exercise his discretion within these definitions. Hopefully 
then, I have made the case that decentralization and decision­
making go hand in hand. If then the premise is accepted that 
decentralization is the distribution through delegation of 
decision-making authority, we can now proceed to another 
aspect of decision-making in federal resource agencies. 
Chapter 4 
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
The public interest is an old often used term with 
respect to decision-making, especially in the federal agencies. 
And quite naturally so, for the federal agencies are in 
business to serve the public interest. However, what con­
stitutes the public interest? Who is to judge where the 
public interest lies? What the public wants? These are 
some of the questions which I address in this chapter. 
"Anything so inchoate and diverse as the large broad 
19 concept of the Public cannot really exist." This quote, 
from Walter Lippmann's The Phantom Public circa 1925, is, I 
think, as true today as it was then. Yet federal agencies 
go on blindly "determining" the singular public interest and 
setting agency policy accordingly. In support of this, I 
offer the following statements from A University View Of 
The Forest Service regarding the recent turmoil over man­
agement of the Bitterroot National Forest: "Over the past 
few years management decisions and policies have frequently 
resulted in situations that have disappointed virtually all 
the publics that make use of the Bitterroot National Forest. 
This situation results, ....because of policies laid down 
15 
16 
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in Washington...." The policies laid down in this case 
were, in fact, that The Public Interest was a singular in~ 
terest for timber production at any cost, regardless of 
other expressed public interests. But is there really a 
single definable public interest? Can a Washington official 
of some agency really know how best to serve the public 
interest; and, knowing that, set policy and preformed decisions 
for his subordinates who themselves are dealing with the 
public? I think not, and, as Charles Reich in a paper 
Bureaucracy And The Forests puts it, "... the Service rec­
ognizes ... that its ultimate job is nothing less than the 
definition of 'the public good,' a task once reserved for 
24 
philosopher-kings." If we are committed to some singular 
public interest, then we are also committed to finding that 
singular public interest. This in reality is an impossibility, 
for the "silent majority" is, in fact, silent, and "... no 
2 
one really knows where 'the public interest' really lies." 
"The task of government [and, therefore, of public admin­
istration in the United States] ... is not to express an 
imaginary popular will, but to effect adjustment among the 
16 
various special wills and purposes." 
The silent majority is either apathetic, acquiescent, 
or ignorant, and the public interest is served in any given 
17 
2 
issue by anything that conflicting groups can agree upon. 
This would seem a much more realistic and rational approach 
to a definition of the public interest. But, lest I stray 
too far from situational and particularized decision-making, 
I will proceed to make my point with the understanding that 
the broad public interest is, in fact, undemonstrable, " 
whereas, the situation of conflicting groups voicing their 
interest is a public reality. 
What we are really talking about is the "sum-of-the-
minorities" concept of the public interest. This is that 
for any given issue the consensus is the majority of the 
vocal. Again, borrowing from Professor Behan, an illustration 
O 
might look thus:^ 
Vocal Minority 
(Two or more active 
minorities) 
Silent majority 
(consenting via 
acquiescence, apathy 
or ignorance) 
Consensus 
(Majority of the Vocal) 
Thus, "through the medium of acquiescence, apathy or 
ignorance, the silent majority consents to the choices of 
18 
2 the active minority." 
This view, that the STom-of-the-minorities more accurately 
reflects public interest is held true by many political 
. ^ 4,6,11,16,18,19,30 _ • I, . 
scientists. The question then is who is 
to determine what the svim-of-the-minorities view is? It must be 
the on-the-ground manager in closest proximity with the public 
minority groups, dealing with these groups situationally and 
particularly as problems arise. "Bureaucratic professionals 
simply have to respond to the public as it is, not as they 
hope it would be." 
Government agencies often equate public interest with 
the long term public benefit. But what of short term public 
benefit? Do we not have public interest in the short run? 
"About the only thing we can be fairly sure of from a study 
of history, barring the possibility of nuclear wars is that 
future generations will be wealthier than we are. Deliberate 
redistribution [of resources] in favor of the future may 
well involve a transfer of wealth from a poorer to a richer 
22 group." We must provide for our children before we worry 
about providing for our children's children. Public interest 
in the short run is real and cannot be defined as the long 
term public benefit. 
19 
The short term is now and must be decided by the s\am-
of-the-minorities concept of public interest, which in turn 
must be decided by the situational decision-maker coping with 
the various publics in whatever capacity he may be in a situ­
ation to handle. The public interest cannot be passed down 
from agency heads in the form of policy guidelines and pre­
formed decisions for the resource manager. For there is no 
singular public interest and the on-the-ground situational 
decision-maker is the key to determining public interest in 
a given situation. 
Chapter 5 
RULES, REGULATIONS AND MANUALS 
5 
"Detailed rules prevent adaptation to changing situations." 
This seemingly quite obvious statement describes perfectly 
the gist of this chapter. That is, a decision-maker working 
under detailed rules, regulations and preformed decisions 
cannot adapt to changing peculiarities and situations which 
occur in his realm, and that really, he is not a decision­
maker at all if bound to work under such conditions. But 
this is precisely how many of our federal agencies operate. 
Again, using the Forest Service as an example, and citing 
Kaufman's The Forest Ranger "By issuing authorizations, 
directions and prohibitions, it is therefore possible to 
influence the behavior of organizations. An extensive 
elaborate network of such issuances envelopes every district 
Ranger."^5 These systems of rules, regulations and preformed 
decisions are, I believe, unjustifiable in view of the fact 
that first, the resources are situationally diverse and com­
plex, and, second, that the needs and desires of the public 
(public interests) are situationally diverse and complex. 
These situationally diverse and complex problems can be handled 
20 
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only by a situational decision-maker in closest contact with 
the resource and the public. The on-the-ground situational 
manager has a better feeling for what might occur as a re­
sult of the action which he takes. For it is impossible for 
an agency head policy-maker to know the particular public 
interest and the implications of resource decisions in the 
vast array of problems arising concerning resource decisions 
nationwide. And then to be able to put down in writing the 
action to be taken to best serve the nation's resources as 
well as the public interest is preposterous I For "No system 
of rules and supervision can be so finely spun that it antici-
5 
pates all exigencies that might arise." If this were so, 
there would be no need for professional on-the-ground land 
managers; "manual trained" technicians could do the job nicely. 
Charles E. Lindblom, in a paper. The Science of 'Muddling 
Through', though speaking of policy-making has expressed 
some views that are, I think, applicable here. He talks of 
incremental policy-making in a way which we could interpret 
18 
here as incremental decision-making. Incremental policy­
making is just that, adjusting policy at the margin to 
accommodate shifting values, interests, and in our case, 
resource problems. Our situational decision-maker can be 
thought of in the same light, whereby he can make his 
22 
decisions relying on past, similar situations, adjusting 
decisions incrementally as each unique situation warrants. 
No one is in a better position to deal with the particular 
decision and to know whether the outcome will be preferred 
politically (public interest), rational economically and 
justified ecologically than the on-the-ground situational 
decision-maker. 
Not only is the on-the-ground situational decision­
maker in a better position to handle his particular resource 
and public (s), but, the agency further suffers in this 
setting of prescribed rules, regulations and preformed 
decisions, because the initiative and innovation of the 
manager is unable to flourish. "Rules set limits hot only 
on what men do but also on what men think. ... the bulwark 
14 against future proposals." And, "if we devise too elabo­
rate a system of checks and balances, [rules and preformed 
decisions], it will only be a matter of time before the 
self-reliance and initiative of our managers will be des­
troyed..."^ It would seem, Ceven putting aside for the 
moment the detrimental effects on agencies and their managers) 
with all the schooling, screening, and on-the-job training 
that resource managers must adhere to in this day, that 
agencies would learn to trust more in the good judgment, hon­
23 
esty, integrity and credibility of its on-the-ground managers. 
Admittedly, in most, if not all resource agencies, the on-the-
ground manager is usually on the bottom rung of the career 
ladder, a deplorable situation. If, as I have noted, that 
resource decisions cannot be made at the top and handed down 
to the on-the-ground manager; and if it is this manager that 
must make the basic decisions, then he carries considerable 
responsibility and should be in a position in the line 
structure commensurate with this responsibility. The so-
called "Bolle Report" considering Forest Service practices 
found likewise; "We find the bureaucratic line structure as 
it operates, archaic, undesirable and subject to change. The 
manager on the ground should be much nearer the top of the 
27 career ladder." 
But rules are seemingly synonymous with organizations 
even though rules might be harming the functioning of the 
organization. R.K. Merton has aptly described this process: 
... top management(s) attempt[s] to 
obtain control over the behavior of 
the members of organizations as the 
organization grows larger and more 
complex. Standard operating procedures 
are instituted and emphasized, while 
control consists largely in checking 
to insure that procedures are followed. 
The consequences are: Ca) Relationships 
become less personalized and are more 
prescribed by the position people 
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hold. Evaluation and reward become 
less closely tied to individual 
achievement. (b) The rules of the 
organization become internalized and 
adherence to rules becomes valued 
even when it no longer results in the 
outcome for which the rule was origin­
ated. (c) Finally, decision-making 
evolves into a process of sorting 
questions that arise into a restricted 
niomber of categories and applying the 
rule connected with the formally 
applicable category rather than 
searching for alternatives. As a 
result, behavior becomes increasingly 
rigid and defensible. Behavior also 
becomes less responsive to customer 
or client needs and more responsive 
to internal organization standards. 
As trouble with outside parties arise, 
individuals feel an even stronger need 
to be able to defend their actions and 
so place an even higher premium on 
following prescribed rules. Manage­
ments' efforts to prescribe behavior 
[to assure the customer's or client's 
needs are served] actually results in 
the loss of the organizations power 
to serve their needs. As a consequence, 
management feels an even greater need 
for control and issues new rules and 
procedures, etc. Thus management 
efforts to control not only have dys­
functional unintended consequences, 
but also a tendency to perpetuate the 
consequences.21 
That, in a rather large nutshell, explains better than I 
the effects and consequences of extensive rules and 
preformed decisions on not only decision-makers in large 
organizations, but on the organizations themselves, and 
their clients. 
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It is, I believe, precisely this chain of rule oriented 
events that has led our federal resource agencies into the 
troubles that confront them today. For, "A rule run organization 
is easily surprised by the unexpected.And unexpected 
they were, for the onslaught of opposition against agency 
practices of recent years, (particularly opposition to 
even-aged forest management practices & clearcutting), 
an onslaught with which managers were unable to deal due 
to the rigidly defined rules, regulations and preformed 
decisions which undoubtedly were followed, and which also 
undoubtedly were the reasons for the agencies' inability to 
cope. Public interest(s), resource values and ecolo­
gical constraints are ever changing entities, and rules 
cannot change fast enough to allow for these changes. Again, 
Herbert Kaufman has captured this idea stating that, "Most 
[appeal] cases arise not because Rangers fail to adhere to 
the preformed decisions of the Forest Service, but because 
15 
they do confoinn." This then, that managers cannot react 
to changing conditions precisely because of preformed 
decisions curtailing their initiative and innovation, is 
the essence of my case. "Decisions affecting the multiple 
uses of forest land [or any public resource] cannot be made 
by standard formulas or rules learned by rote. The forester 
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[or any public resource manager] must work in uncertainty 
O 1 
and controversy." 
Chapter 6 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
SUMMARY 
In this paper, I have attempted to demonstrate that 
situational management is the key to managing federal re­
source agencies in a manner that is justifiable ecologically, 
feasible economically, and acceptable politically. To do 
this, I have sought to show what a professional manager must 
do, and how best he can accomplish his ends. I have frequently 
used logic though in most cases this logic has been substan­
tiated by other investigators. A summation of my studies 
follow. 
Chapters 1 and 2 dealt with what I have called the 
"Park Service Experiment", and, therefore, they will be 
combined here. The Park Service, by eliminating its 
manuals, presented a unique opportunity to employ a system 
of situational management as I have portrayed in this paper. 
The director of the Service had determined that the manuals 
were becoming a substitute for decision-making, and that 
managers were using the manuals in lieu of professional 
judgment to protect their positions. The manuals were being 
2 6 
used as the authority instead of as guidelines. Because 
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of this, the manuals were eliminated and the Administrative 
Policy booklets were substituted in their place. I'll not 
delve into those again, as I have already noted their potential 
worth. However, the experiment seemingly did not work, and as 
such, would seem contrary to my previous writing concerning 
situational management. Again, however, as I have also pre­
viously noted, there were some drastic, extenuating circumstances 
which I believe contributed to the experiment's downfall. 
They are as follows; 
(1) Goals and objectives went undefined, 
leaving employees without direction. 
(2) Work standards were not set up, thus 
job performance could not be guaged. 
(3) The director's management technique 
of reorganizing whenever decisions 
were made without his knowledge and 
approval. 
The last of these circumstances was probably the most fatal. 
Men naturally feared for their careers as a result of the 
director's techniques, and, thus, deferred decisions to him. 
Situational management was by no sense of the term taking 
place, and, thus, did not get a fair trial. 
In Chapter 3, the concepts of preformed decisions and 
organizational decentralization were discussed. The ty/o 
concepts basically are at extreme opposites. Decentral­
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ization, is the distribution through delegation, of decision­
making authority, whereas, preformed decisions are the 
distribution of decisions to the "decision-maker." I have 
argued that preformed decisions are unjustifiable in view of 
the situationally diverse and complex problems facing on-the-
ground managers. Further, that decentralization, in fact, 
giving managers true discretion within the confines of their 
authority is essential for managing public resource agencies. 
Chapter 4, brought up the age-old controversy of public 
interest. Who is to decide what the public interest is in a 
given issue? Here, I presented, with the support of many 
others, the case that "... the public interest in any given 
issue is served by anything that two conflicting minorities 
2 
can agree upon." The situational manager is in the best 
position to arbitrate the public interest in decisions which 
he must carry out. Some vague concept of public interest 
whereby agency heads "decide" the public interest of the 
I 
silent majority is intangible and unrealistic, and, "... 
through the medium of acquiescence, apathy, or ignorance, 
the silent majority consents to the choices of the active 
2 minority." Therefore, active minorities will voice their 
opinions and express their wishes to a situational manager 
who is in the best position to weigh the differing public 
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interests and to harmonize them with the other ecological 
and economical constraints. "The task of government ... is 
not to express an imaginary popular will, but to effect 
adjustment among the various special wills and purposes ..."^ 
The situational manager can best affect this adjustment 
since the active minorities will voice their various special 
wills and purposes to him. 
Chapter 5, is similar to Chapter 3, in that rules and 
prefoiTtied decisions are very similar. Detailed rules handed 
down from agency heads deprive a manager of using his skills 
and resourcefulness in making decisions that are necessarily 
unique to his area of responsibility. Charles E. Lindblom, 
writing on the subject states that, "The attempt to push 
categorization as far as possible and to find general 
propositions which can be applied to specific situations 
18 
is what I refer to with the word 'theory'." Not only this, 
but detailed rules and regulations prevent a manager from 
adapting to changing peculiarities and situations which 
occur, besides undermining the self-reliance and initiative 
of decision-makers. 
CONCLUSIONS 
TO say that situational management would have been 
successful had the previously mentioned deficiencies in 
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the Park Service experiment been removed, would be con­
jecture at this point. However, on the basis of my studies 
the odds are in its favor. 
Concerning manuals, rules, regulations and pre-formed 
decisions, there are good reasons for them, not the least 
of which involves repetitive type work. There is good 
reason to commit to writing this type of work as far as 
time saving in job performance and in the training of new 
employees is concerned. There is a fine line between that 
of no manuals creating problems of no direction, and that 
of too extensive a manual system creating a shelter and 
stifling initiative for employees. "The problem is one of 
all of [the] professionals in an organization of recogniz­
ing - of being able to delineate and define what things have 
to be handled by the manager as breaking new ground, and 
what things can be handled in the tradition - under the old 
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system." The point of this paper is that this judgment 
should be left up to the situational manager, and not pre­
scribed for him in the form of preformed decisions. For he 
is in the best position to know all the unique circumstances 
surrounding a decision and, likewise, he should have the 
opportunity to break new ground when the situation warrants. 
The on-the-ground situational manager has a better feeling 
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for what might occur as a result of his action. 
There are essentially three things which a professional 
public resource manager must look to when evaluating a 
decision. They are; the resource, the public, and economics. 
In the light of this, he is then the best qualified to make 
decisions concerning his area of responsibility. He is 
trained in the knowledge of the resource and should know 
the peculiarities of that resource in his area better than 
others. The particular public(s) interest in the decision 
will make their opinions known to him, while economically, 
the manager, through agency budgets, congressional appro­
priations, etc., knows what he can and cannot do in this 
regard. Who then is better qualified? 
I have presented my case and find that a situational 
manager must be the answer. Though this paper is by no 
means definitive, I think it has shed some light and though 
the conclusions may be inexact, they are inescapable in view 
of my studies. 
SUGGESTIONS 
As I have stated, this study is neither definitive nor 
conclusive, so perhaps a suggestion or two would be in order. 
An elaborate system of rules, regulations, pre-formed 
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decisions and the public resource agencies penchant for 
determining the public interest has been, I think, dis-
proven in previous chapters as the best means of decision­
making at the ground level. We've found also, however, 
that the Park Service's rather radical attempt to change 
this system ended in a qualified failure. Qualified because 
at least it showed that people were aware and thinking about 
the problem, even though their solutions were perhaps too 
much-too fast. 
There is a place in organizations where manuals, rules, 
regulations and pre-formed decisions fit in and also, of 
course, since public resource agencies are set up to serve 
the public, the public interest must be served. I have 
argued, however, that the on-the-ground manager is in the best 
position to know what that public interest is in his area 
of responsibility, and that rules and regulations, etc., 
should not stifle a professional on-the-ground manager's 
initiative and resourcefulness. 
While it is probably true that organizations and agencies 
do not make rules, regulations, etc., specifically to stifle 
their managers, it seems that this is the case as Kaufman re-
15 
peatedly points out in regard to the Forest Service. 
And, as Bernard Baum has pointed out, "if we devise too 
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elaborate a system of checks and balances, [rules and pre­
formed decisions], it will only be a matter of time before 
the self-reliance and initiative of our managers will be 
destroyed 
But organizations and bureaucratic agencies change 
ever so slowly, and a trend toward giving on-the-ground 
managers greater responsibility in real decision making 
authority is not going to come about simply because reports, 
papers, theses, etc., advocate such a change. Change will, 
I think, have to come from the bottom, from the on-the-ground 
managers working now in the field. Top rung organizational 
officials will have to be shown that decisions for and about 
the resource and the particular publics at the ground level, 
can and should be made by the ground level professional. 
Much of what follows, what I consider alternatives and 
a means of attaining the above, is taken or has evolved 
from a book by Neil Postman and Charles Weingartner, 
2 3  
The Soft Revolution. In it, the authors describe ways 
to work within the system to achieve goals virtually un­
attainable from without. 
Following then are some thoughts to consider which 
could turn the agency around - giving more real decision-
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making authority to on-the-ground managers: 
1) "Render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's," -
and go about your business. For a start, this 
will provide the manager with a means to do 
things his own way, while still supplying the 
agency with its "fuel" for self-preservation. 
In other words, don't break the rules and pre­
formed decisions of the agency, simply bend them 
to fit you and your client's particular needs. 
Don't infuriate or frighten people. Give them 
their reports, follow their directives, then go 
about the business of providing the best pro­
fessional help possible. As I said, this is 
only a start and will not cause any significant 
change. It will merely give the professional 
manager the means to maintain his professional 
integrity, while also supplying the agency with 
its supposed needs. In other words, don't sac­
rifice professional integrity for bureaucratic 
exactness. 
2) When attempting to make a change, first ask why 
some procedure used is good for the clientele -
the Service? Do not give the impression that 
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your ideas are more virtuous, just that you may 
have a better idea to attain the virtuous goals. 
For example, all public resource managers would 
agree, I hope, that the public deserves the best 
possible ecological and economical resource man­
agement available. Do not question that pre­
formed decisions and rules and regulations do 
not attempt to achieve this, but merely that 
as a trained professional resource manager in 
closest contact with the public, you are 
in the position to make decisions the conse­
quences of which cannot readily be known by 
whoever wrote the pre-formed decision and caused 
it to be placed in the agency manual. 
3) Virtually all agencies and bureaucracies have 
solemn beliefs that, (it is assumed), bind the 
organization together. In the Forest Service 
multiple-use management is emphasized "(with 
apparent unawareness of its obscurity)" as is 
the idea "... that the national forests must be 
managed for the greatest good of the greatest 
number in the long run (again, with no evident 
15 
recognition of this slogan's ambiguities)." 
37 
A more general and far reaching solemn belief 
is that resource agencies function better with 
not only central direction, but central decision­
making as well. It is the job of the resource 
manager desiring change in this regard, to make 
visible the ridiculousness of solemn beliefs. 
Suggest alternative procedures - seriously, not 
solemnly, and have solutions to problems that 
you might bring up because administrators are 
always full up with problems. The solutions 
that you suggest might be tried simply because 
no one else has the time, the energy or the 
inclination to figure out anything better. 
Don't simply suggest that some procedure is 
wrong, but have viable solutions at the ready. 
4) As institutions grow, (and this is especially 
true of governmental bureaucracies) the purposes 
of the institution are overshadowed by its earnest 
desire for self-preservation. For, "that is the 
way with institutions. Their forms, including 
23 
their rhetoric, always survive their functions." 
Many pre-formed decisions, rules and regulations, 
etc., are exactly for this purpose, that is self-
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preservation of the institution. Recognize 
these for what they are, and again "Render unto 
Caesar that which is Caesar's" - and go about 
your business. 
5) "A major characteristic of the American culture 
is that it is pluralistic. If pluralism means 
anything, it means the availability of options. 
Where there are no real options, you have a 
23 
fraudulent pluralism ..." Pre-formed decisions 
leave the on-the-ground resource manager in many 
cases, without options. A manager or decision­
maker without options is nothing more than a 
figurehead. This is a useful point to use when 
opting for change. 
The above suggestions are offered not perhaps as alter­
natives , but as a means by which on-the-ground decision­
makers might work within agencies to effect changes that 
my studies and experience have shown are needed. 
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